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**PRESENTATION 4.3.10**

**"PROPULSION SYSTEM GROUND TESTING"**

**BY**

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**OBJECTIVE**

**TO PROVIDE MANAGEMENT VISIBILITY RELATIVE TO THE ROLES OF  
SIMULATION AND PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING FOR FUTURE  
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS THROUGH ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT  
PROPULSION RELATED SIMULATION CAPABILITIES AND REVIEW  
OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST PROGRAMS.**

# BASIS FOR PRESENTED DATA

## CONTENT

## SOURCE

- |                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| • DEVELOPMENT STATIC<br>FIRING DATA | SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN PROPULSION<br>SATURN STAGES |
| • ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY             | JUDGEMENT                                      |
| • PROGRAMATICS DATA<br>(ROCKWELL)   | ORBITER<br>SATURN S-11<br>APOLLO CSM<br>GEMINI |
| • PROPULSION SPECIALISTIC<br>SURVEY | RESPONSE TO SURVEY                             |

### REPORT

"ADVANCED NSTS PROPULSION SYSTEM VERIFICATION STUDY  
FINAL REPORT" - JULY 31, 1989

## SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

(NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

EVALUATION CRITERIA	VEHICLE FLIGHT CATASTROPHE RISK	MISSION LOSS RISK	LAUNCH DELAY RISK	LAUNCH COMPLEX RISK	SYSTEM TEST PROVIDES DATA	REMAINING RISK AFTER 20 SECOND FRF
"Wrong" Component Verification	Very High	Very High	High	High	Yes	Low
Instrumentation Failure	Moderate	Moderate	Very High	Very High	Yes	Minor
Hazardous Fluid Leakage	High	High	Very High	Very High	Yes	Moderate
POGO Failure	Moderate	High	Minor	Minor	Can	Moderate
Thrust Vector Control Failure	Low	Low	Low	Minor	No	Minor
Propellant Loading Procedures/Opera- tions	No	No	Very High	High	Yes	No benefit
Clustered Engine Performance	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor	Yes	Minor
Performance Margin Uncertainty	Minor	High	No	No	Yes	Moderate
Stored Gas Mass, Loading, Operations	Minor	Minor	Minor	Moderate	Yes	Minor

# SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

## (NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

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Pressurization System Performance	Moderate	High	Minor	Minor	*Yes	Moderate
Propellant Mass Uncertainty	Minor	Moderate	Very High	Minor	Yes	Low
Low Level Cutoff Sensor	Minor	Minor	Moderate	No	Yes	No benefit
Engine/Feed Systems Chill	Minor	Minor	High	Minor	*Yes	Minor
Tank Insulation	Minor	Minor	High	Minor	*Yes	Minor
Hardware Thermal Control	Minor	Minor	High	Moderate	*Yes	Minor

\* Mission Dependent

# SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

## (NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

RISK, DEGREE	RISK CATEGORY				REMAINING RISK AFTER 20 SEC	
	VEHICLE FLIGHT CATASTROPHE RISK	MISSION LOSS RISK	LAUNCH COMPLEX RISK	LAUNCH DELAY RISK		
VERY HIGH	1	1	0	4	0	
HIGH	1	4	2	4	0	
MODERATE	3	2	2	1	4	HAZARDOUS FLUID LEAKAGE POGO PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE MODEL UNCERTAINTY
LOW	10	8	11	6	11	

# ADVANCED VEHICLE SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

(NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

EVALUATION CRITERIA	SHUTTLE	ADVANCED VEHICLE WITH SMALLER VOLUME, COMMON BULKHEAD	
	FLIGHT CATASTROPHIC/ LAUNCH DELAY RISK	ALTITUDE START	ORBITAL START
		RISK	RISK
Pressurization Systems Performance	Moderate/ Minor	Much Higher/ Same	Significantly Higher/Higher
Propellant Mass Uncertainty	Minor/ Extremely High	Higher/Same	Much Higher/Same
Engine/Feed System Chill	Minor/High	Higher/Same	Significantly Higher/Higher
Tank Insulation	Minor/High	Higher/Same	Much Higher/Same
Hardware Thermal Control	Minor/High	Higher/Same	Significantly Higher/Higher

Note: Risk relative to shuttle.

## SIMULATION ASSESSMENT

### CONCLUSIONS

- SIMULATION WITHOUT PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING RESULTS IN A HIGH RISK PROGRAM.
- WITHOUT PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING:
  - FLIGHT CATASTROPHE/LAUNCH DELAY AND OTHER RISKS ARE UNACCEPTABLY HIGH.
  - 20 SECOND FRF REDUCES RISK.
  - ORBITAL/ALTITUDE ENGINE START REQUIREMENT INCREASES RISK SIGNIFICANTLY RELATIVE TO SHUTTLE TYPE PROPULSION SYSTEM.
- THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERACTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS SUBSYSTEMS DEFIES ACCURATE SIMULATION. SYSTEM TESTING PROVIDES FOR MODEL BASING AND ENHANCES SIMULATION.


# EMPIRICAL COSTING RELATIONSHIPS

RELATIONSHIPS	SOURCE
<u>AVERAGE TEST/VERIFICATION COST</u> NON RECURRING DDT and E Cost (ALL DISCIPLINES)	Approximately 4.9 Percent (4.2%) Gemini S-II Apollo CSM (5.2%) STS Orbiter
<u>MPS TEST COST</u> MPS DDT and E Cost	Approximately 8.3 Percent STS Orbiter Excluding SSMEs
<u>MPS TEST COST</u> Average Test and Verification Cost (All Disciplines)	10 to 15 Percent Deduction

NOTE: Excludes Government Furnished

- Facilities
- Equipment
- Other

## ECONOMICS OF TESTING



CONCLUSION: ONE VEHICLE LOSS PREVENTED BY MPS TESTING IS COST EFFECTIVE.

# SYSTEMS TESTS IDENTIFIED EVENTS

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STAGE	CATASTROPHE		UNWORKABLE		TOTAL PER STAGE
	FLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	FLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	
SHUTTLE	3	3	5	17	40
S-1C	4	0	3	3	13
S-II	2	0	8	8	21
S-IVB	8	0	6	3	20
S-I/IB	5	1	4	2	15
S-IV*	2	0	3	1	6

\* Incomplete

\*\* Includes Categories not included

## EXAMPLE

### SHUTTLE

SSME NOZZLE STERN HORN RUPTURE - H<sub>2</sub> DUMPED.  
MARGINAL STABILITY CHARACTERISTICS - ET/ORBITER 17" O<sub>2</sub> DISCONNECT.

### SAT V

F-1 ENGINE TO STAGE BOLTS STRUCTURAL FAILURES  
S-II ENGINE THRUST CHAMBER CHILL FAULTY - ENGINE STALL POTENTIAL

## MPTA Hardware Replacement and Repair

MPTA Test Number	Pumps	Major Valves	EIU/MDMS	Other	LH2 Recirculation System, Pressurization System	Valves	Sensors	LH2 Diffuser, Feed Line Screens, Other
	← ENGINE →				← VEHICLE →			
1-002				1	4	5	4	1
2							1	2
3				1		1	1	2
4							1	1
5-A	12	9		1			4	3
5			1		4	2	4	
6-01		9	1	1			2	
6-02/3	1	7		2	3		5	1
6-04			1	5			4	
7-01		1						
7-02		2			2		4	
8		2			5	1		
9-01	1						4	
9-02	4		1		1	1	2	
10		4	10	3	1		2	
11-01	2	7			4	6	2	
11-02				3	6	4		
12				3		1		
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>10</b>

Note: Hardware changes made prior to designated test number



## MPTA TESTING EVALUATION

ATTEMPTED FIRINGS/ABORTS	INERTING PURGE USAGE	FIRE WATER USAGE (EXTERNAL)	ABORT SOURCE
21/9	5K - 12 System  30K - 3 System	6	Vehicle 2  Engine 8

## MPTA TESTING EVALUATION

CONTINUED


ABORT CAUSE			
FAULTY INSTRUMENTATION	ENGINE REDLINE VIOLATION	ENGINE HARDWARE FAILURE	EXTENDED PROGRAM DELAYS
3	3	3	2



# SATURN V, IB, I TESTING EVALUATION

DEVELOPMENT STAGES					FLIGHT STAGES	
VEHICLE	TEST NUMBER	ABORTS	TEST INADVERTENTLY "CUT"	TEST STAGE DESTROYED	ACCEPTANCE TESTED	DESTROYED IN TEST
SIC "ALL SYSTEMS"	15	5	3		15	1
S-11 BATTLESHIP ALL SYSTEMS	54 9	29 6	1	1	15	
SIV B	21	-	-	1	27	1
SI/IB	23	6			22	

## MPTA TEST SCHEDULE



**NOTE: R/L - RESONANT/LOADING TESTS**

## CONCLUSIONS

- PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING IDENTIFIED MANY ISSUES HAVING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE FOLLOWING CONSEQUENCES:
  - CATASTROPHE; BOTH FLIGHT AND PREFLIGHT
  - MISSION LOSS
  - SIGNIFICANT LAUNCH DELAY
  - SIGNIFICANT LAUNCH COMPLEX DAMAGE
- SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING WAS REDUCED VS. SATURN AND CAN BE FURTHER REDUCED FOR SIMILAR FUTURE PROGRAMS.
- ELAPSED TIME SPAN FOR MPTA TESTING WAS EXCESSIVE AND CAN BE REDUCED.

## PROPULSION SPECIALIST "SURVEY"

**REQUEST:** SUMMARIZE YOUR OPINION OF THE ROLE OF "ALL-UP" SYSTEMS TESTING IN VERIFICATION OF A NEW PROPULSION SYSTEM PRIOR TO FIRST LAUNCH.

**REQUEST**

**RESPONDENTS:** SIXTY SIX ROCKET/SPACE VEHICLE DESIGNERS AND MANAGERS.

**RESULTS:** OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORT PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING.

**RESPONSE**

**EXAMPLES:** "WERE I SCHEDULED TO RIDE ON A NEW LAUNCH VEHICLE, SYSTEM TESTING WOULD BE A PRIMARY REQUIREMENT."

"IF ANY ITEM IS GOING TO FAIL, HAVE IT FAIL ON THE GROUND WHERE IT CAN BE DIAGNOSED AND FIXED BEFORE FLIGHT."


# "SPECIAL" VEHICLE SIMULATION ISSUES

(PROPULSION RELATED)

VEHICLES IN THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT HAVE ADDITIONAL DESIGN/ OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

- PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT
- PROPELLANT THERMAL CONTROL
- TANK PRESSURE CONTROL
- PROPELLANT DYNAMICS
- PROPELLANT RESUPPLY

## "SPECIAL" VEHICLE ISSUES



# **"SPECIAL" VEHICLE ISSUES**

## **(PROPULSION RELATED)**

### **SIMULATION ASSESSMENT:**

**FOR SOME ISSUES -**

- **NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT EXIST**
- **DEMONSTRATION OF TECHNOLOGY NECESSARY**
- **ORBITAL EXPERIMENTAL DATA NECESSARY**
- **DEVELOPMENT STAGE GROUND TEST POSSIBLE/DESIRABLE**
- **SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT GROUND FACILITIES REQUIRED**

### **SUMMARY**

- **THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERACTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS SUBSYSTEMS/DISCIPLINES DEFILES ACCURATE ANALYTICAL REPRESENTATION. SYSTEM TESTING PROVIDES DATA FOR MODEL BASING AND ENHANCES ANALYSIS.**
- **HISTORICALLY SYSTEM TESTING HAS PREVENTED CATASTROPHE AND MISSION LOSS FAILURES, LAUNCH DELAYS AND LAUNCH COMPLEX DAMAGE.**
- **PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING IS COST EFFECTIVE IF ONE VEHICLE LOSS IS PREVENTED.**
- **ADVANCED/ "SPECIAL" VEHICLES HAVE AN EQUAL/GREATER REQUIREMENT FOR PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING.**
- **PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING IS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTOR TO MISSION SUCCESS ASSURANCE.**